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DON'T KNOW MUCH ABOUT HISTORY,
POLITICS, OR THEORY: A COMMENT
Robert J. Spitzer*
INTRODUCTION
Bernard Harcourt's article' in this publication draws our attention
to the oft-repeated claims made by gun control foes that an armed
civilian population promotes democracy and even civil discourse.2
Regarding the latter, witness, for example, the slogan that "An Armed
Society is a Polite Society," an aphorism that even has its own gun-
centered website.3 Yet the assignment of politeness and civility to
guns in this fortune-cookie-claim contradicts the very purpose of
weapons when directed at human behavior-to animate human
behavior either by threat or actualization of the deaths of human
beings. Guns might be used to create a democratic system (although
here, too, the gun rights people usually get it wrong), but their use as
political instruments, if necessary at times, contradicts the very idea of
democratic governance. The unsurpassed virtue of democracy is that
it substitutes ballots for bullets.
This observation about governance parallels writings on the Second
Amendment that have noted similar distortions of the historical
record advanced by those who defend the individual rights view of the
Second Amendment. As Garry Wills concluded in his analysis of the
individualists, "[blad history serves bad logic."4  Saul Cornell calls
these writings "an exercise in law office history of a particularly
bizarre kind."5  From the perspective of political science, these
* Distinguished Service Professor, Political Science, SUNY Cortland. The author
thanks Judith Best and Sanford Gutman for their advice and assistance.
1. See Bernard E. Harcourt, On Gun Registration, the NRA, Adolf Hitler, and
Nazi Gun Laws: Exploding the Gun Culture Wars (A Call to Historians), 73 Fordham
L. Rev. 653 (2004).
2. Id.
3. See Polite Society, at http://www.polite-society.org (last visited Sept. 13, 2004)
(gun information and sale web site that posts the quote prominently, attributing it to
the science fiction author Robert Heinlein); see also Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig,
Principles for Effective Gun Policy, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 589 (2004).
4. Garry Wills, A Necessary Evil 221 (1999); see also Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and
Found: Researching the Second Amendment, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 349, 375 (2000).
5. Saul Cornell, A New Paradigm for the Second Amendment, 22 Law & Hist.
Rev. 161, 164 (2004); see also Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated
Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 487 (2004).
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individualist writings not only misuse history, but also misunderstand
comparative political systems, regime formation and change, and even
the nature of governance.
I. THE ROLE OF THE STATE
The first purpose of government is to establish and maintain order,
a task that cannot be divorced from the use, or threatened use, of
state-sanctioned force. As many political thinkers have noted, human
existence before the establishment of governments was chaotic and
anarchic. Writing in the seventeenth century, British political theorist
Thomas Hobbes noted that life in such a state of nature was "solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short."6 The only "law" in this environment
was that of self-preservation, when one could only expect the "war" of
"every man, against every man."7 To stave off nightmarish anarchic
conditions, people formed governments to which citizens traded some
of their freedoms, including the "freedom" to kill or be killed without
examination or recrimination, in exchange for the order of civil
society. In such a "civil state," according to Hobbes, "there is a power
set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith."'
This power to constrain incorporates the state's use of force.
Writing several decades after Hobbes, British political thinker John
Locke concurred, noting that "God hath certainly appointed
government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily
grant that civil government is the proper remedy for the
inconveniences of the state of nature .... "I That we in America
largely take the value of order for granted is a testament to the
remarkable and welcome stability of American life.1" Order is not the
only priority for government, of course, since democratic nations
value freedom and the protection of basic rights as well, and must
continually strive to strike an appropriate balance between these
values." Nevertheless, order is the first purpose of government
because without order there can be no freedom in society, aside from
6. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 82 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell 1960)
(1651).
7. Id. at 83. Writing in 1651, Hobbes cited the example of "many places of
America" where such primitive conditions existed. Id. Hobbes also said that "the
condition of mere nature" is "a condition of war of every man against every man." Id.
at 89.
8. Id. at 90.
9. John Locke, Of Civil Government 11 (Henry Regnery Co. 1955) (1689).
10. American history is of course pockmarked by civil strife, from the Whiskey
Rebellion of 1794 to the 1992 Los Angeles riots following the beating of motorist
Rodney King. The greatest threat to public order in American history, the Civil War,
nearly destroyed America as we know it. Despite these and other such instances,
however, American society has certainly been among the most ordered, despite its
size, diversity, and democratic values.
11. The philosophical and practical problems of balancing order and freedom are
discussed in Robert J. Spitzer et al., Essentials of American Politics 6-9 (2001).
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the "freedom" of anarchy (the state of nature to which Hobbes and
Locke referred). As political scientist Samuel Huntington once noted,
"Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have
liberty without order. 1 2
The maintenance of public order by governments occurs through
the formation and implementation of public policy. The close link
between order and public policy is underscored by the interesting
semantic fact that "policy" has the same linguistic root as "police. "13
Note the link between the two in this definition of public police
offered by British constitutionalist William Blackstone in 1769:
[Tihe due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby
the inhabitants of the State, like members of a well-governed family,
are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of
propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent,
industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.' 4
None of this analysis precludes justifiable personal use of force,
such as in the case of self-defense or the questioning of government
authority. Freedom is an exalted value, but it takes on the positive
attributes so often ascribed to it by Americans only when tempered
with order. To take a contemporary, non-American case, witness the
fitful process of state-building currently underway in Iraq. In the Iraqi
Provisional Constitution, adopted in March 2004, the Iraqi framers
included this prohibition as Article 17: "It shall not be permitted to
possess, bear, buy, or sell arms except on licensure issued in
accordance with the law."15  This strict gun control declaration
contradicts the gun rights, state-building manifesto which would seek
to promote, not inhibit or regulate, private gun ownership as the best
way to promote democratic values and a more civil society. It is
patently obvious, of course, that democratic state-building would only
be frustrated by a policy that encouraged civilian arms carrying and
12. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies 7-8 (1968).
13. See Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy 91 (1968);
see also Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism 273 (1979). According to the
Oxford English Dictionary, the definitions of "policy" and "police" both refer to each
other, and share the Latin root "politia." See Oxford English Dictionary 22-25, 27-28
(2d ed. 1989). Henry C. Black defined police power as securing "generally the
comfort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of its citizens by preserving the public
order, preventing a conflict of rights in the common intercourse of the citizens, and
insuring to each an uninterrupted enjoyment of all privileges conferred upon him or
her by the general laws." Black's Law Dictionary 1156 (6th ed. 1990). The police
power, Black continues, "is the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to
promote order, safety, security, health, morals and general welfare within
constitutional limits and is an essential attribute of government." Id. at 1156-57.
14. See 5 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 2506 (Leonard W. Levy et
al. eds., 2000) (quoting William Blackstone).
15. Coalition Provisional Auth., Law of Administration of the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period (March 2004), available at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/government/TAL.html.
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use. Indeed, the process of state-building has as its central tenet the
establishment and maintenance of a regime in possession of the
legitimacy and ability to exercise sufficient force over the nation to
maintain order and execute the law. The reality of this bedrock fact is
seen in daily news accounts of persistent American efforts to organize,
train, and equip the fledgling Iraqi police force, and vehement
opposing efforts to terrorize, disperse, and undercut that force by
Iraqi insurgents. Further, one cannot help but be struck by the irony
that the Bush administration, which has been guided in at least some
foreign policy matters by the National Rifle Association ("NRA"),16
would nevertheless countenance the codification of strict gun control
in the Iraqi Constitution.
To cite a different example of a genuinely baffling and bizarre
miscomprehension of the importance of governmental order and
authority, consider this analysis offered by lawyer David C. Williams
in his recent book, The Mythic Meanings of the Second Amendment. 7
As if to demonstrate that some legal writers are intent on distorting
not only history but political theory, Williams introduces his book by
arguing that the militia-based or collective view of the Second
Amendment "rests on a Weberian myth: with the sociologist Max
Weber (although usually without referring to him) it holds that one of
the defining characteristics of the state is its monopoly on the
legitimate use of violence."18 Williams manages to commit a parade of
errors in less than a sentence.
First, Williams never cites any Second Amendment writers who cite
Weber in this connection, for the obvious reason that he assigns to
these Second Amendment writers a Weberian contraption of
Williams's own construction. That these writers fail to "refer" to
Weber owes, no doubt, to the fact that their writing has nothing in
particular to do with Weber. Second, aside from repeating Weber's
name, Williams never consults, quotes, or cites any of Weber's
writings in his book, leaving the reader to wonder how and why
Williams can lay any meaningful claim to what he dubs Weberian
analysis. Third, some of the collective or militia-based writing on the
Second Amendment predates Weber,"9 undercutting Williams's claim
that this school of thought is "Weberian" in any sense of being
derived from Weber's writings or thought. Fourth, the views of state
power he assigns to Weber predate Weber, as the discussion in this
Essay demonstrates. And fifth, Williams evinces no understanding of
16. See Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Rights for Terrorists? Gun Control and the Bush
Presidency, in Transformed By Crisis: The Presidency of George W. Bush and
American Politics 158-60 (Jon Kraus et al. eds., 2004).
17. David C. Williams, The Mythic Meanings of the Second Amendment (2003).
18. Id. at 5.
19. See Robert J. Spitzer, The Right to Bear Arms 24-35, 72 (2001) [hereinafter
Spitzer, The Right to Bear Arms]; Spitzer, supra note 4, at 385; see also Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
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how political theory has evolved on the question of state authority,
power, and the "use of violence," apropos of Hobbes, Locke, and
other theorists. Yet none of this impedes Williams's seat-of-the-pants
analysis. "Weberians," he asserts, "offer an image of a very simple
world: unless one wants to accept Timothy McVeigh's terrorism as
constitutional, then one must give all power over violence to the
government. 2  Perhaps by assigning to Weber (whose life spanned
from 1864 to 1920) alone the idea that the state has a unique claim to
authority regarding the use of force, Williams hopes to minimize the
theoretical formulations behind the proposition. But not only does
this notion span the writings of Hobbes and Locke,21 it traces back to
Aristotle 22 and even before. Indeed, one of the most ancient, pre-
Aristotelian governing principles is that "[e]very sovereign.., has the
right to punish anyone who pretends to a private revelation in order
to oppose the laws. "23
The writings of French political philosopher Jean Bodin (1530-
1596) illustratively echo, and long predate, Weber's construct. In his
Six Books on the State, Bodin offered a detailed formulation of
modern state authority, including its monopoly over the use of force.
"The state is a lawful government, with sovereign power .... [W]e
speak of the state as 'lawful government' in order to distinguish it
from bands of robbers and pirates, with whom it can have no part,
commerce, or alliance."24  Bodin continued, "Sovereignty is the
absolute and perpetual power of the state, that is, the greatest power
to command. '25 Bodin made clear that the exercise of sovereignty is
applicable in democratic as well as monarchical regimes: "While they
are in authority they still cannot call themselves sovereign rulers,
inasmuch as they are only custodians and keepers of sovereign power
until it shall please the people or the prince to recall it .... 26 This
power of the state, according to Bodin, encompasses power over the
aristocracy and the people at large, as "power to dispose of their
property and persons. "27
20. Williams, supra note 17, at 103.
21. Williams gives brief mention to these two theorists, but seems oblivious to the
broader underpinnings uniting Weber, Hobbes, Locke, and other theorists. See id. at
123, 141, 374 n.174 (discussing Hobbes); id. at 29-38, 87-88, 126-27 (discussing Locke).
22. For example, see William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers (1969), who
notes that Aristotle framed the question of state authority as "moral sovereignty,"
reflecting his more organic view of governing in the context of Greek city-states. Id. at
69. By the seventeenth century, according to Ebenstein, the state was "sharply
distinguished from all other organizations because it alone possesses sovereignty, or
the highest authority in a politically organized community, and the legal monopoly of
enforcing such authority in its territory." Id. at 68-69.
23. Laurence Berns, Thomas Hobbes, in History of Political Philosophy 390 (Leo
Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 1981).
24. Ebenstein, supra note 22, at 354.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 355.
2004]
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Let me offer this brief effort to prop up Williams's otherwise
hapless foray into political theory. It is true that Weber wrote about
the use of force (although, apparently unbeknownst to Williams,
Weber was hardly the first, as the writings of Bodin and others
illustrate): "The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of
force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and
of continuous organization. "28 Yet this does not mean that citizens are
stripped of any recourse to justifiable violence, as Weber also noted
that "the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either
permitted by the state or prescribed by it."29 Thus, for example, a
citizen acting for personal self-defense acts as an individual, but is
nevertheless accountable to the state's judgment under the law.
Weber elsewhere clarifies the antecedents and consequences of the
state monopoly over the use of force. In this writing, two features
emerge: that Weber's analysis is empirical (an analysis of what is
true), and that it represents his own formulation arising from past
theorists. "Every state is founded on force,"3 Weber noted. "If no
social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then the
concept of 'state' would be eliminated, and a condition would emerge
that could be designated as 'anarchy'.... "31 Weber here is
referencing the Hobbesian state of nature, and making the empirical
observation that the very existence of the modern nation state rests
upon state-exercised force.
Referencing state authority to exercise violence or force, under
circumstances established by the laws of the state and as the
fountainhead of politics, Weber continues: "The state is considered
the sole source of the 'right' to use violence. Hence, 'politics' for us
means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution
of power, either among states or among groups within a state."32 It is
because of this state monopoly that non violent politics can occur.
Were it not for the state's monopoly, politics would quickly devolve
into violence-precisely what occurs when regimes in the modern
world are toppled by violence without stable regime replacement or
succession. The very reasons that American troops continue to
occupy Iraq more than a year after toppling the Hussein regime, and
that so much effort is being exerted to establish an indigenous police
force (and why these forces are the focus of rebel attacks and
disruption), are to avoid the horrors of a lawless society where no
28. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 156 (Talcott
Parsons ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1947).
29. Id. Weber does not cite the example of personal self-defense, but does give a
similar example: that of a parent disciplining a child. Weber was writing in the
nineteenth century, when familial corporal punishment was more widely accepted. Id.
30. Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 78 (H.H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills eds., 1946).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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regime is capable of exercising a monopoly over the use of force, and
to pave the way for a regime that is able to exercise such authority
with, one hopes, an appropriate counterbalancing of individual rights
and democratic structures. America has already delivered freedom to
Iraq; but the American military effort there will be judged a success or
failure by its ability to establish a stable, non-tyrannical order.
II. WHAT THE NAZI CASE TELLS US
To build on Harcourt's analysis of the case of Nazi Germany,
consider an article published by NRA lead lawyer Stephen P.
Halbrook, in which he attempts to show that gun control laws enacted
first during the post-World War I Weimar Republic, and then
strengthened during the Nazi regime in the 1930s, were key to Nazi
consolidation of power and the regime's effort to disarm, terrorize,
and kill political opponents, including Jews.33 In his article, Halbrook
consulted primary sources from the 1920s and 1930s to chronicle
German gun control legislation and efforts to harass Jews using legal
gun confiscation as the pretext. As Halbrook said, "how might the
course of history been different had Germany... been a country
where large numbers of citizens owned firearms without intrusive
legal restrictions and where the right to keep and bear arms was a
constitutional guarantee?"34 How, indeed.
Assuming that Halbrook offered an accurate historical picture of
German gun legislation and Nazi tactics, he nevertheless fails to
accurately portray the Weimar era and the reasons for Hitler's ascent.
In fact, even the most casual examination of the Weimar early Nazi
era leads to two contrary conclusions. First, that guns and gun control
were a very minor component of Nazi ascension. Second, to the
extent that gun possession and use played any role, it was the extra-
legal use of violence (and Nazi gun possession and use, to the limited
extent it existed) by Hitler's paramilitary gang, the S.A., which fought
pitched battles in the streets against Communists and Social
Democrats. In other words, if gun control facilitated the rise of Hitler
at all, it was because of Germany's weak Weimar regime, which was
unable to suppress the pitched battles, and other bullying political
tactics, between warring factions in German streets. Once Hitler won
election in 1932 and consolidated power, he surely did take steps to
confiscate guns as part of the larger campaign to disarm and render
powerless opponents of the state, but by this point the intra-German
battle against Hitler had been lost.
That Halbrook missed the salient characteristics of this era is clear
from two glaring omissions: the failure to cite, with a handful of
33. Stephen P. Halbrook, Nazi Firearms Law and the Disarming of the German
Jews, 17 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 483 (2000).
34. Id. at 530.
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exceptions, any of the standard secondary historical and political
literature on the era,35 and the failure to examine in any detail Hitler's
rise to power culminating in his election as chancellor. Hitler's
ascension can be generally attributed to at least three key facts: the
popularity of his movement in the context of Germany's defeat and
humiliation following World War I, his brilliance as a propagandist
and orator, and Germany's dire economic conditions especially in the
early 1930s. Hitler's S.A. was an effective terrorist force that wreaked
violence and intimidation against other political factions, in part
because it included significant numbers of World War I veterans who
were well-trained and experienced in military tactics and discipline,
and who were also allowed to keep their military weaponry at the end
of the war.36
Halbrook wanted to argue that strict gun laws facilitate, if not
cause, authoritarian regimes, and therefore to conclude that nations
with few gun laws and strong gun rights are more likely to be breeding
grounds for democracy. The problem with his analysis was that actual
cases of nation-building and regime change, including but not limited
to Germany, if anything support the opposite proposition.
III. GUN CONTROL: THE LONG MARCH BACKWARD
In a very different, if similarly illuminating way, Kristin Goss's
analysis of the gun control movement37 also directs our attention to
the disparity between political imagery and political reality as it has
played out in the last five decades. According to Goss, the gun
control movement's policy approach in the 1960s and 1970s-to seek a
"rational national" solution to gun control-yielded steady political
reversal. Over time, control strategists came to appreciate the value
of political incrementalism after finding ambitious national policy
restrictions rebuffed, and after suffering political rebukes by gun
rights groups that successfully painted their opponents as neo-fascist
"gun-grabbers."
The irony of the arc of the gun control movement is that the trend
from a comprehensive, policy-rational approach in the 1960s-1970s to
a much narrower, incremental approach since the 1980s (epitomized
by the control side's two greatest recent political victories-the Brady
Law of 1993 and the Assault Weapons Ban of 1994), is that this policy
35. Out of 290 footnotes, Halbrook cited barely a dozen secondary sources, an
especially alarming fact given that he is neither a scholar nor expert on 1920s-1930s
Germany. See generally id.
36. Some standard works on the subject (none of which is cited by Halbrook)
include: Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (2000); Erich Eyck, A
History of the Weimar Republic (1970); Rudolph Heberle, From Democracy to
Nazism (Grosset & Dunlap 1970); Detlev J.K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic (1992).
37. See Kristin A. Goss, Policy, Politics, and Paradox: The Institutional Origins of
the Great American Gun War, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 681 (2004).
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arc began much earlier. Indeed, an examination of America in the
1920s shows that the national gun control debate of that time was not
only less polemical, but was more far-reaching, and from a gun rights
perspective, extreme, than that of recent decades.
While it may seem strange today, there was much national
discussion and debate in the 1920s over the enactment of gun laws
that, by contemporary standards, would be considered very strict. The
gun control debate of the 1920s was brought on mostly by growing
public dismay at the rising toll of handgun-related deaths and
"mayhem" (witnessed especially in urban areas), dating back to the
late 1800s, and by the rise of gangster-related violence witnessed after
alcohol prohibition took effect in 1919. Chief among proposed gun
policy reforms was licensing of gun owners, strict regulation or
outlawing of more powerful weapons, such as the Tommy gun, and
the outright banning of pistols. This latter proposal is especially
interesting because it represents the most extreme and dramatic
proposed gun regulation raised in the public forum from the 1920s to
the present. Numerous books, articles, and countless editorials in the
1920s discussed the many facets of a ban on pistols and other gun
control measures.38 For example, an entire book of essays and
arguments on the virtues and problems of a pistol ban was published
in 1926.39 This book consists of a detailed summary of the arguments
on both sides, followed by a bibliography of over ninety articles,
mostly from newspapers and magazines, and eleven articles reprinted
in full. The book begins with a resolution offered in typical forensic
debate format: "That the manufacture, sale, importation,
transportation, and possession of pistols and of cartridges to fit them
should be prohibited except as needed for army, navy, police, and
other official purposes."4  This proposition had already won the
support of prosecutors, police chiefs, judges, many lawmakers around
the country, and the American Bar Association through its Special
Committee on Law Enforcement.41
An even more startling fact of the gun debate in the 1920s was the
active and affirmative role played by gun groups. A leading and
pioneering force in the authorship of model uniform firearms
legislation was the United States Revolver Association, "a non-
commercial organization of amateur experts in the use of revolvers. "42
While it worked to insure that responsible gun owners could continue
to obtain access to firearms, including pistols, it also supported tough
gun regulations to keep guns out of the wrong hands. In 1923 alone,
California, North Dakota, and New Hampshire all adopted firearms
38. Frederick L. Hoffman, The Homicide Problem (1925).
39. Outlawing the Pistol (Lamar T. Beman, ed. 1926).
40. Id. at 7.
41. See generally id.
42. Charles V. Imlay, The Uniform Firearms Act, 12 A.B.A. 767, 767 (1926).
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legislation copied from the Revolver Association's
recommendations.43
Even though strict pistol regulations were widely discussed and
debated in the press, state capitals, and Congress in the 1920s, the
federal government failed to act except for a 1927 law that barred the
sale of handguns to private individuals through the mail. This law
passed muster in the pre-New Deal era in part because its advocates
argued that the measure supported, rather than eroded, state
sovereignty. More far-reaching efforts to regulate handguns,
including a proposal to regulate interstate handgun sales, died in
congressional committee. The failure of these more ambitious efforts
was attributable in large measure to opposition by President Calvin
Coolidge, the general belief of the time that the federal government
should be little involved in policy matters considered to be the
prerogative of the states, and the related belief that state action was
the most appropriate venue for policy change.44
This state-centered view of federalism underwent seismic change in
the depths of the Great Depression and as a consequence of Franklin
D. Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930s, when the national government
assumed sweeping new powers and responsibilities formerly left to the
states or to private individuals. Some state governments responded
with tougher laws in the 1920s, but even then policymakers realized
that sporadic state responses were likely to be ineffective without a
uniform national standard. Even so, the range of national policy
debate was still markedly broader in the 1930s than in subsequent
decades. For example, Roosevelt's first attorney general, Homer
Cummings, said in a 1935 speech: "[N]or do I believe that any honest
citizen should object to having all classes of lethal weapons placed
under registration."45 Two years later, he said: "Show me the man
who does not want his gun registered and I will show you a man who
should not have a gun. '46 Cummings's successor as attorney general,
Robert Jackson, recommended to Congress in 1940 that all firearms
be registered, that all weapons transfers be recorded, and that each
transfer be taxed.47
Whether one agrees or disagrees with these proposals, most would
agree that no attorney general in the modern era, of either political
party, would dare to venture such opinions as part of the public
debate on guns in America. If a healthy public policy debate on any
policy subject is defined by its breadth, then this may be taken as
additional evidence of the stunted nature of the current gun policy
debate in America.
43. Spitzer, The Right to Bear Arms, supra note 19, at 79.
44. See Robert J. Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control 110-11 (3d ed. 2004).
45. Selected Papers of Homer Cummings 82 (Carl Brent Swisher ed., 1939).
46. Id. at 89.
47. See A 1940 Proposal: Register Firearms, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1989, at A31.
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